Fayetteville State University

DigitalCommons@Fayetteville State University
Faculty Working Papers from the School of
Business and Economics

Accounting, Finance, Healthcare Administration,
and Information Systems

12-25-2014

An Analysis of Individual Tax Morale for Russia: Before and After
Flat Tax Reform
Bee K. Yew
Fayetteville State University, byew@uncfsu.edu

Valentin B. Milanov
Fayetteville State University, vmilanov@uncfsu.edu

Robert W. McGee
Fayetteville State University, rmcgee3@uncfsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uncfsu.edu/sbe_faculty_wp
Part of the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Yew, Bee K.; Milanov, Valentin B.; and McGee, Robert W., "An Analysis of Individual Tax Morale for Russia:
Before and After Flat Tax Reform" (2014). Faculty Working Papers from the School of Business and
Economics. 1.
https://digitalcommons.uncfsu.edu/sbe_faculty_wp/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Accounting, Finance, Healthcare Administration, and
Information Systems at DigitalCommons@Fayetteville State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Working Papers from the School of Business and Economics by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Fayetteville State University. For more information, please contact dballar5@uncfsu.edu.

International Business Research; Vol. 8, No. 1; 2015
ISSN 1913-9004
E-ISSN 1913-9012
Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education

An Analysis of Individual Tax Morale for Russia: Before and After
Flat Tax Reform
Bee K.Yew1, Valentin B. Milanov2 & Robert W. McGee1
1

Department of Accounting, Finance, Healthcare Administration and Information Systems, Fayetteville State
University, Fayetteville, USA
2

Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville, USA

Correspondence: Bee K. Yew, School of Business and Economics, Fayetteville State University, NC 28301, USA.
Tel: 1-910-672-1487. E-mail: byew@uncfsu.edu
Received: November 6, 2014

Accepted: December 20, 2014

Online Published: December 25, 2014

doi:10.5539/ibr.v8n1p60

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v8n1p60

Abstract
This paper examines individual tax morale in Russia before and after the introduction of flat tax reform in 2001.
The World Values (WVS) and European Values Survey (EVS) are used to compare individual tax morale in 1999,
2006 and 2011. An ordered probit regression model is applied to study the effects of socio-demographic and
institutional variables on individual tax morale. A new variable for employment sector that appeared in 2006 and
2011 values surveys is included in our model. The probit regression results revealed significant coefficients for
income scale and the employment sector variables with negative marginal effects on tax morale.
Socio-demographic variables have varying effects on tax morale while institutional variables are positively
related to individual tax morale for the three years. To detect linear trend associations, Mantel-Haenszel
hypothesis test results indicate that individual tax morale for Russia has not changed in the years before and after
flat tax reform.
Keywords: flat tax reform, ordered probit regression, tax morale, employment sector, income level
1. Introduction
1.1 Why We Pay Tax
Taxes are important for a country and its citizens. Tax revenues allow the government to provide public goods
and services that support and maintain the economic machine. These public goods and services include
infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, railways, electric power, and government offices and
institutions. Tax revenue also supports administrative and policy-making services employed to manage the
economy and financial markets, and to educate, protect, and care for its citizens. The US Internal Revenue
Service described tax gap components as non-filing, under-reporting and under-payment. In the US, the
under-reporting component remains the largest component since 2001. Tax filers who evade taxes by declaring
improper deductions, overstating expenses, credits or exemptions, belong to this category. Tax evasion activities
are illegal as they reduce tax revenues, create a sense of unfairness, alter income distribution, and impact on
public services for citizens.
This paper analyzes individual tax morale in Russia from a social-psychology perspective. The next section of
the paper summarizes the literature review on perspectives in tax compliance research. Our interest in Russia
stems from the implementation of a flat tax system in 2001, and the impact of flat tax on tax morale in the
country. Survey data from WVS (World Values Survey, 2014) for 2006 and 2011 and from EVS (European
Values Survey, 2014) for 1999 were analyzed using an ordered probit regression model that included income
level, sector of employment, demographics and institutional variables. The dependent variable, tax morale is a
ten-scale index with two extreme points, “fully justified” and “always justified”. The 10-scale index response to
the tax morale question is transformed into a 4-point scale levels based on the variability of responses to the
question. The model study includes the new variable on employment sector in surveys completed in 2006 and
2011. EVS survey data for Russia is analyzed for 1999, and then compared with two transition years in 2006 and
2011 using WVS survey data. Our research study builds upon the work of Alm, Vazquez and Torgler (2006) on
the attitudes of Russians toward paying taxes during transitioning years from a centrally planned economy to a
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market economy during the 1990s. The purpose of our study is to explore the impact of a major tax reform on
individual tax morale in a transition economy. The findings from this study may have implications on taxation
policies in transition economy countries and developing countries.
1.2 Tax Research
Tax research can be viewed as driven by economic concern for a widening tax gap, the need to collect more tax
revenues, and the need to understand the social-psychology and cultural effects on tax compliance behavior. The
two broad categories of tax research studies are focused in understanding and explaining tax compliance
behavior (Frey, 2003; Torgler & Schneider, 2009; Maksvytienė & Šinkūnienė, 2012; Doerrenberg & Peichl,
2013), and in detection of tax fraud using data mining approach (Farid & Tkiouat, 2012, Gonzalez & Velasquez,
2013). Early tax research literature based on the utility maximizing economic theory has shifted to a growing
attention on understanding tax behavior based on social-psychology theories (Devos, 2007)
1.2.1 Deterrent-Focused
Deterrence models based on expected utility maximization to predict tax evasion assume individuals evade tax
when expected gain exceeds the cost of detection and penalty. Phillips (2011) described the ideology underlying
tax deterrence research paradigm as driven by a belief that “it is an inherent wish of taxpayers to pay no tax
liability, and are deterred from evading taxes in the face of risks of tax audit, fraud detection and penalty”.
Bloomquist (2012) employed agent-based modeling to assess the impact of auditing strategy alternatives on tax
compliance behavior in misreporting cases. The approach is based on a 2-stage model of verification and
validation testing with assumptions about taxpayer behavior based on knowledge accumulated from field studies,
laboratory experiments and random audits. In another computational model application, DeBarr and Harwood
(2004) suggested the use of relational data mining to screen tax returns using indicators or criteria endorsed by
tax compliance experts. Farid and Tkiouat (2012) proposed a data mining approach in their fraud detection
model for improving efficiency in auditing process. They suggested that causes for tax fraud include complexity
of the tax system, moral considerations, social and cultural norms, and tax administration. In the Gonzalez and
Velasquez (2013) study, different data mining approaches were compared to characterize and detect users of
falsified invoices based on information about their tax payments for Chile.
Deterrence models analyze the cost-benefit of maximizing expected utility in tax evasion gamble experiments
that are based on “economics of crime” (Becker, 1968). The Allingham and Sandmo (1975) deterrence model is
based on the assumption that “a typical individual pays taxes only because of fear of detection and punishment”.
Empirical and experimental studies however revealed conflicting results. Countries with low tax evasion have
relatively low deterrence measures and higher tax rates. Yitzhaki (1974) explained that the inverse relationship
between tax rate and evasion exists because of how the penalty is derived. If the penalty is proportional to the tax
amount understated as opposed to being proportional to income understated as assumed in Allingham et al.
model, then the reward-to-risk ratio remains unchanged as the tax rate increases. Therefore, if the higher tax rate
has only an income effect, the higher tax rate will correspond with lower tax evasion for the risk-averse
individual.
Frey (2003) proposed a different strategy in studying taxation based on crowding theory and empirical results
that predicted high levels of tax evasion with high levels of tax compliance in countries such as the United States
and Switzerland. The incongruous empirical results seem to suggest that certain group level effects may have an
influence on tax compliance behavior. Tax compliance is described to be a “quasi-voluntary” behavior that
“cannot be reasonably enforced by deterrence measures,” and that the true cost of tax administration is not just
the auditing and related costs, but also the cost of ensuring that taxpayers are willing to pay taxes. The latter cost
is based on crowding theory on the effects of incentives or punishments that undermine intrinsic motivation.
Thus, the question of “why people pay taxes” as opposed to “why people evade taxes” has been proposed as a
direction in tax research (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2010).
1.2.2 Tax Morale and Tax Compliance
Tax morale is an individual quality that is associated with compliance behavior. In analyzing the ethics of paying
taxes, the deontological view holds that the action is morally good, while the teleological view sees the moral
standard as the value in the outcome of such an action. A deontological perspective individual views the moral in
paying taxes as simply following the rules. A teleological perspective individual on the other hand views the
outcome of paying taxes as the driver for moral action. Overarching cultural and social norms and religious
beliefs may therefore have an influence on paying taxes. If public goods and services are viewed as having a
positive impact on the quality of life in a civilized society, the individual is more likely to pay taxes.
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Tax compliance is a voluntary behavior in which the individual reports all income earned. In general, higher tax
compliance is found with third party information reporting or withholding. Tax compliance is described to be
influenced by many factors such as disposition towards public institutions, perceived fairness of taxes, prevailing
social norms and perceived risks of being caught and punished (Franzoni, 1999). In contrast, evading taxes is an
illegal act and is described as failure to report or under-reporting of income and is punishable. This is in contrast
to someone who avoids paying taxes legally by exploiting loopholes that exist in tax laws, or by filing for
deductions, credits and adjustments to income by proving that the criteria or standards for claims are met.
Cummings, Martinez-Vasquez and Torgler (2009), revealed a significant correlation between tax morale and tax
compliance. Tax morale and institutional quality were significant predictors for shadow economy in another
study (Torgler & Schneider, 2009).
Cummings et al. (2009) investigated how tax morale affects compliance in Botswana and South Africa,
neighboring countries with different social histories. Their study results revealed that while tax compliance
increases with individual perception of good governance, a smaller increase is also observed when less good
governance is perceived. Perception of good governance indicated by individual responses to enforcement
practices in audits and penalties is observed to correlate with tax morale. While enforcement effort has a positive
effect on compliance, its effect is reduced by perception of less good governance. In an attitudinal and behavioral
survey on tax compliance in Ireland, a high level of tax morale is observed among participants surveyed (Cleary,
2009). However, a significant proportion of the survey’s participants perceived that “deliberate tax evasion is on
the increase” and “few people report all their incomes”. The survey also revealed that at least half of the
participants believed that “paying too much taxes”, “taxes collected are used poorly”, and “not getting paid
enough” are reasons why people avoid paying taxes.
Doerrenberg et al. (2013) investigated the effects of progressive taxation on individual tax morale. The cross
country analysis using the World Values survey data for 4 waves is a logistic regression model with tax morale as
the dependent variable, with explanatory and control variables were tax progressivity, economic indicators,
demographic variables, national pride, trust and confidence in government and religiosity variables. Their results
showed that women and married people have higher tax morale than men and singles respectively. Other
variables that have a positive effect on tax morale were religiosity, patriotism, being retired and being employed.
Their findings showed that tax progressivity has a decreasing positive association with tax morale which
suggested that “progressive taxes contribute to less tax evasion and higher perceived fairness and equality”.
Since the causality in the relationship cannot be inferred, it may well be that citizens with higher tax morale
support a more progressive tax system.
Maksvytiene and Sikuniene (2012) proposed that tax culture is a concept that encompasses attitudes and
behaviors of participants in a tax system, and its tax relations with participants to increase tax revenue. Their
proposed tax culture model includes macroeconomic factors such as the country’s economic development, social
status of citizens, education system level, and participant experience and upbringing.
An empirical study on tax morale for Latin American countries revealed findings that support social factors and
institutional factors are significant determinants of tax morale (Taschetti, 2013). However, a comparison of tax
morale between Argentina and Chile is inconsistent with the tax compliance estimates for these countries.
Further analysis with an added interaction variable for perception of compliance improves the prediction on tax
morale for Argentina. An important conclusion from the study is that tax compliance is a function of both tax
morale and deterrence, and their interaction in a feedback loop may help to improve understanding of tax
compliance. This conclusion is similar to the Torgler (2005) study of tax morale in the same region. His findings
revealed that individuals who have knowledge of tax evasion of others have significantly lower tax morale.
The shadow economy has been associated with tax morale in various studies (Tekeli, 2011; Alm & Torgler, 2005;
Torgler, 2011; Torgler & Schneider, 2009). Schneider (2007) defined shadow economy as market-based legal
goods and services that were produced but were not reported as income. Shadow economy is estimated using the
DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model. In this economic model, money supply since
activities related to the shadow economy are transacted in cash, and real GNP (Gross National Product) are the
main variables.
Frey and Weck (1983) pointed out that results are different from various approaches to derive the hidden
economy such as in conducting interviews, experiments on risk aversion, measuring labor participation rate,
estimating tax fraud estimation and analyzing currency payments related to tax-avoiding activities. They
proposed a shadow economy model that is based on human behavior and institutional characteristics. Their
multiple regression model’s determinants are taxes and tax regulations, tax morality and perception of tax burden,
62

www.ccsenet.org/ibr

International Business Research

Vol. 8, No. 1; 2015

and labor participation rate, unemployment rate and working time as labor market variables.
Torgler, Schaffner and Macintyre (2008) employed several models to explore the “puzzle of tax compliance,”
which refers to the unexpectedly high level of tax compliance predicted using economic models. A multivariate
regression model is applied to estimate the shadow economy by regressing tax morale with GDP per capita, share
of agriculture in GDP, share of urban population, labor force, marginal tax rate, region and fixed time as control
variables. Their results revealed that “substantial growth in the shadow economy can lead to crowding out of
willingness to pay taxes”, or tax morale. The size of the shadow economy is also found to be negatively
correlated with trade, but is positively correlated with agricultural GDP and urbanization. Using experiments to
examine the impact of tax morale on tax compliance, tax morale is found to have a strong and positive impact on
tax compliance. Females and older individuals are more compliant, higher group transfer has a positive impact
on tax compliance and individual wealth has a negative impact on tax compliance. A probit regression analysis
on tax morale indicated that institutional quality, trust in the judicial system, gender, status, education and
religion variables are significant.
1.2.3 Russia Informal Sector
Ever since the Soviet Union imploded, the former Soviet republics have been having a difficult time collecting
the revenue they need to run their governments. However, some republics have done better than others. Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, which have since joined the European Union, have a relatively strong system of public
finance in place, by Soviet standards. Most of the other former Soviet republics and satellite countries in central
and Eastern Europe have not fared as well. A large portion of the taxes that is legally owed in these republics is
not being collected, for a variety of reasons (McGee, 2012).
Two of the main reasons for the collection problems have to do with a system of public finance that is too weak
and inefficient to gather the taxes, and the general attitude of the people, many of whom believe that their
government is corrupt and has little or no moral claim on their income.
Several studies have investigated the attitudes of the people in these former Soviet satellites and republics, and
the conclusions reached are similar. A study of Armenian opinion found that people evade taxes because it is easy
to do so and because of the widespread perception that their government is corrupt and therefore not entitled to
the money (McGee, 1999). Studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina (McGee, Basic & Tyler, 2009), Bulgaria
(Smatrakalev, 1998, 2012), Estonia (McGee, Alver & Alver, 2012), Poland (McGee & Bernal, 2006), Russia
(Vaguine, 1998; Preobragenskaya & McGee, 2004), Slovakia (McGee & Tusan, 2008) and Ukraine (Nasadyuk &
McGee, 2008) have reached similar conclusions. Figure 1 shows the public sector’s perception of corruption in
Russia from 1999 to 2011 from the Transparency International Organization (2014). The Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) score range from 1 to 10, with a low score indicating higher level of corruption for the country.
Compared to other countries, Russia CPI ranking placed it in the second to the third lowest group of countries in
the world during these years.

Figure 1. Corruption perception index for Russia
Other reasons found in studies of non-Soviet republics and satellites for why tax evasion is justified is the
perception that the government is wasteful in its spending habits, or that the tax system is unfair (Crowe, 1944;
McGee, 2012). Such studies have been done for Greece (Ballas & Tsoukas, 1998), Iran (McGee & Ardakani,
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2009), and Romania (McGee, 2006).
Working off the books has both positive and negative effects for those who work in the informal sector. The
obvious positive effect is that workers get to keep 100 percent of what they earn. Some studies have found that
the informal sector provides more flexibility and opportunities for creativity than does the formal sector.
However, there is a downside as well. Some negative effects of working in the informal sector include lower
wages, less job security and fewer fringe benefits such as insurance and pensions (Ferrel-i-Carbonell & Gërxhani,
2011).
If one applies economic analysis and cost-benefit theory, one might reasonably conclude that reducing the tax
rate would increase compliance. More people would find the benefit of evading taxes to exceed the cost when tax
rates are high than when they are low. As tax rates decline, fewer people would conclude that tax evasion is
worth the risk. However, it is unlikely that reducing tax rates will completely eliminate noncompliance for at
least two reasons. Some people will evade taxes regardless of the tax rate because the system allows them to get
away with evasion (McGee, 1999; Torgler, 2007, 2010). Others will evade because of the feeling that the
government is not morally entitled to a slice of their income, or at least not the size of the slice it is taking
(McGee, 2012). Tax morale was found to be negatively correlated with unemployment rate and inflation in Spain
(Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2009) and during an economic crisis (Heinemann, 2010).
The informal sector or “shadow economy” comprises a large portion of the total Russian economy with as many
as 38 million people working in the shadow economy, according to at least one report (Lysizin, 2013). As a result,
much of the taxes raised in Russia are from sources other than the individual income tax, including the value
added tax, which is the largest source of tax revenue (Wikipedia, 2014). However, there is some evidence to
suggest that reducing the individual income tax rate has had a beneficial effect on the formal economy, as some
workers shift from the informal sector to the formal, taxpaying sector (Slonimczyk, 2012).
1.3 Russia Tax Reform
According to the Encyclopedia of the Nations, “Russia’s tax system has been historically confusing, inefficient,
unwieldy and overbearing.” During Russia’s transition period from 1992 to 1998, Gregory and Brooke (2000)
noted that unreported economic activities for tax assessment was estimated to be around 20% to 40% of GDP in
1995, with over 40% of its monetary assets circulated in the shadow economy. During this period, “tax collected
was 40% to 60% of the assessed amount, thus a minimum of 40% of tax due was not collected on known income
and economic activities.” Not factored into these estimates are shadow economy activities, revenue loss due to
an overly-complex tax system, the general lack of tax compliance culture, and political deals on waived tax and
non-monetary settlements.
Berenson (2007) compared tax compliance attitudes in three post-communist countries: Poland, Russia and
Ukraine using a binomial logit regression analysis. The Tax Compliance Attitudinal Survey incorporated
questions related to theories about deterrence and quasi-voluntary tax compliance, and effects of prior experience
and interaction with the tax authority. Quasi-voluntary theory on tax compliance is based on the notions that trust
in government to provide goods and services for its people and trust in others in paying their fair share of taxes.
The comparison revealed differences in attitudes in these countries. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, tax
attitudes are found to be more influenced by deterrence measures, with higher significance for Russia.
In 2001, Russia replaced progressive tax rates of 12%, 20% and 30%, with a single tax rate of 13%. The flat tax
includes a standard deduction with additional deductions for education, medical and housing expenses. Adoption
of the low 13% flat tax rate has been associated with growth in real Personal Income Tax (PIT) revenues of 26%
in 2001, 21% in 2002 and 12% in 2003. The charts in Figure 2.1 show Personal Income tax rates before and after
tax reform 2001, and in Figure 2.2 Russia Corporate tax rates from 2004 to 2014.
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Figure 2.1. Russia personal income tax rate
Source: Duncan, D. (2012, February).

25%
24%
23%
22%
21%
20%
19%
18%

Figure 2.2. Russia corporate tax rate
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com.

Ivanova, Keen and Klemm (2005) investigated the increase in real PIT revenues in Russia after flat tax reform in
2001, and its effect on tax compliance. Their economic analysis indicated that there is an increase in tax
compliance with no evidence of a strong supply effect due to tax reform.
The Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez and Peter (2009) economic analysis is based on a difference-in
difference (DID) and regression discontinuity approach using data from the RLMS. Their model included
deadweight loss from PIT in the presence of tax evasion based on consumption response. Results from their
analysis showed that the tax reform had the effect of decreasing tax evasion by an estimated 9% to 12% in
unreported income for households with the reduced marginal tax rate. Moreover, their examination of tax
enforcement records from before and after tax reform from 1999 to 2003 found no evidence to support the
increase in tax revenues after tax reform due to better enforcement effort by comparing accrued and received tax
revenues, number of on-site audits, number of tax charges brought against state individuals and enterprises,
individual entrepreneurs, number of blocked accounts and criminal cases. This led to their conclusion that the
decline in tax evasion is attributed to an increase in voluntary compliance, and not to greater tax enforcement.
Their consumption-income model with tax-evasion-adjusted deadweight loss resulted in at least 30% smaller
efficiency gain than the standard method that considered only the income response. The deadweight loss in their
model refers to social well-being that is lost due to taxation policy. If the cost of evasion is based on the cost of
being caught and fines and not on the real cost of hidden income, the adjustment for deadweight loss in their
consumption-income model is likely to be a more accurate reflection of efficiency gain due to tax reform for
Russia.
Duncan (2012) suggested that the increase in PIT may be due to factors other than the lower marginal tax rate.
Lower tax rates have been empirically associated with behavioral responses such as change in number of hours
worked, number of jobs, and income shifting. Duncan and Peter (2010) analyzed the effect of Russia low flat tax
65

www.ccsenet.org/ibr

International Business Research

Vol. 8, No. 1; 2015

reform on work hours for men and women. Their DID regression analysis indicated that tax reform has resulted
in increasing the probability of finding jobs for both men and women, and a significant increase in working hours
for men but not for women. Further analysis on working hour distribution for women labor supply effects
revealed a positive effect on labor response for part-time and the highest work hour distributions with no effect
on the middle work hour distribution. Their conclusions on labor effects due to tax reform is that the small
“reform-induced change in labor supply is an unlikely explanation for the amplified PIT revenues following the
reform”, and the flattening of the tax rate is more likely to benefit countries with high tax non-compliance than
countries with high tax compliance.
Pogorletskiy and Söllner (2002) reported that Russia’s progressive tax system introduced during its early
transition period in 1992 failed in implementation due to then existing informal institutions that are characterized
as having a high level of mistrust towards the government, the importance of barter transactions, and taxpayers’
and authorities’ lack of experience with such a system. Russia’s tax reform of 2001 disbanded the progressive tax
system and introduced the flat tax system, with one low tax rate of 13% for individuals, and in 2002 introduced a
maximum corporate tax rate of 24%, which further dropped to 20% due to the global recession in 2008. Prior to
the tax reform, corporations were at a 43% tax rate. Another important feature of the tax reform is the
replacement of the four separate social security taxes with a unified regressive social security tax rate. In addition,
employees are not required to pay into pension funds. A clear advantage of the low flat tax system is that it is a
simplified system that makes “tax evasion less worthwhile and induce taxpayers with high incomes to leave the
shadow economy and legalize their incomes”. Before the reform, employers paid employees low wages in their
books, and paid remaining wages in cash to avoid social security taxes.
So how does a progressive tax system compare to a flat tax system on the subject of tax morale? The
Doerrenberg et al. (2013) cross country study on the effects of progressive tax rates on tax morale showed that
progressive tax rates correlates positively with the tax morale level, and the positive impact of tax progressivity
declines with higher income. Their empirical analysis is based on a model of self-centered inequality aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) in which individuals dislike inequitable outcomes when comparing themselves to
others in payoffs. Their conclusions suggested that “progressive taxes contribute to less tax evasion and higher
perceived fairness and equality” while it is also possible that higher tax morale and inequality aversion of
citizens may facilitate governments to implement higher tax progressivity.
2. Method
2.1 Dataset and Variables
For our analysis we used survey data from the World Value Survey (WVS) and European Value Study (EVS).
The WVS consists of national questionnaire surveys conducted in countries in which their populations in total
comprise 90 percent of the world’s population. The survey data is compiled into waves, covering periods of five
years. The survey is designed to collect individual perceptions, beliefs and attitudes on family, work,
environment, religion, values, national identity, democracy, government system, politics, diversity, culture and
subjective well-being. Similarly, the EVS provides insights of individual ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes,
values and opinions all over Europe.
The 1999 (wave 4), 2006 (wave 5) and 2011 (wave 6) year survey data consisted of 2040, 2500 and 2500 data
records in total, respectively. In order to compare the results these three waves of data, we use a subset of the
data for the following variables: TAX MORALE, as dependent variable, and a set of explanatory variables AGE,
GENDER, education (EDUC), marital status (MAR.ST), perceived economic situation (CLASS), employment
status (EMPL), trust in government and legal system (TRUST), national pride (NATL.PRIDE), work sector
(WORK.SECTOR), and scale of income (INCOME.SCALE) as determinants of TAX MORALE Work sector is
a new variable that appeared in the last two waves; wave 5 (2006) and wave 6 (2011). Definitions of all variables,
along the survey questions on which the variables are based, can be found in Table A5 in the Appendix section of
this paper. To verify the quality of the data, records with missing values in variables considered in our model
were dropped.
The TAX MORALE variable, originally on a ten-scale index with the two extreme points “1”-“never justified”
and “10“-“always justified”, is rescaled to form a variable from 0 to 3, where 3 means “never justifiable” and
value “0” means “always justified”. On this scale, a higher numeric score indicates a higher tax morale. The
points 4 to 10 are combined in the value 0, due to lack of variability and simple interpretation.
Data for the CLASS variable exists only for 2011. This question is not found in 1999 and the question was not
asked for 2006. Further, a combined variable TRUST is formed using the average of the two variables (trust in
government and legal system) for 2006/2011 and using only trust in legal system for 1999 (no question about
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trust in government).
Observations which have missing values are dropped from the original dataset resulting in a total of 2039, 1162
and 1370 records are included in the analysis for 1999, 2006 and 2011 respectively. We excluded records with
missing values and/or non-informative response. The data processing and analyses were done using the R
programming language (R Core Team, 2012). Descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Table A3 and
Table A4 in Appendix A.
The following sub-sections describe the groups of variables in our model.
2.1.1 Income Level Factor
Bilgin (2014) revealed that both income level and financial satisfaction have significant effects on tax morale
among other variables such as age and education level for Spain. Individuals in the top income group with a high
level of financial satisfaction have lower tax morale. Another empirical study on effects of financial satisfaction
and happiness on tax morale in Asian countries has also indicated that these factors have a positive impact on tax
morale (Torgler, 2004).
The income distribution question is asked in WVS in the following way “On this card is an income scale on
which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to
know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries,
pensions and other incomes that come in”. Figure 3 shows the income scale distribution for complete
observations in our dataset for 1999, 2006 and 2011.

Figure 3. Income scale by year distribution
Figure 4 shows sparklines for the distribution tax morale responses with a collapsed scale for tax morale, “0” for
lowest morale and “3” for highest tax morale, and markers for the highest and lowest tax morale levels for each
income scale.

Income
Scale

1999
0

1

2

2006
3

0

1

2

2011
3

0

1

2

3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Figure 4. Tax morale distribution by income scale
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A study on how inequality affects tax morale in Latin America and Caribbean countries using the
Latinobarometro 2005 survey revealed that individuals who are older and have more years of education have a
higher probability of tax morale, while individuals with a higher level of incomes and are self-employed have a
lower probability of tax morale (Gerstenblüth, Melgar, Pagano & Rossi, 2012). Their results included an analysis
of the effects of the Gini index and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) on tax morale. The probability for higher
tax morale decreases when the Gini index for countries indicates less income inequality and lower CPI. The tax
morale question in the Latinobarometer survey is asked in the following way, “Within 1 to 10 scale, where 1
means “not at all justifiable” and 10 means “totally justifiable”, how much justifiable do you think tax evading
is?” Responses were collapsed into 2 levels, 0 for low tax binary for all levels 1 through 8 and 1 for two levels 9
and 10 for “not at all justifiable” and “totally not justifiable”.
The Global Wealth Report 2013 reported that a high inequality exists with Russian billionaires owning 35% of
all personal assets, while it is expected that billionaires worldwide collectively own 1% to 2% of household
wealth. The Gini index is a measure of inequality that is obtained by computing the deviation of perfect equality
line from the cumulative distribution of income function known as the Lorentz curve. In the case of perfect
equality, the Gini index is 0% and at the extreme end, the Gini index for perfect income inequality is 100%.
Therefore a low Gini index indicates a more equal distribution of income in the society. Figure 5 shows the GINI
index for Russia from 1999 to 2009.

Figure 5. Gini plot for Russia
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Last updated April 23, 2013.

The Palma ratio is a relatively new measure of income inequality which is derived by dividing the richest 10% of
the population’s share of the Gross National Income (GNI) by the poorest 40% of the population’s share of GNI.
It is observed that the Palma ratio captures about 50% of GNI for any country. The remaining 50% of the
country’s GNI is shared between the richest 10% and the poorest 40% for which “distributional politics is largely
about a battle between the rich and the poor for this remaining 50% of GNI, and who the middle classes side
with.” A high Palma ratio indicates wide inequality gap, which can be narrowed by “raising the share of GNI of
the poorest 40%, and/or reducing the share of the top 10%.” The Palma ratio and GINI index produced the
similar income inequality outcomes, Russia Palma ratio in 1990 is 0.79, and in 2010, this ratio increases to 1.885
(Cobham and Sumner 2013).
2.1.2 Employment Sector Factor
The survey question in the WVS surveys on individual employment sector is asked with three possible responses
in the following way: “Are you working for 1. Government or public institution, 2. Private business or industry,
3. Private non-profit organization”. The chart in Figure 6 shows the responses for individuals with complete
observations for 2006 and 2011 survey for the Russian Federation.
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Figure 6. Employment sector distribution
Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) worked on estimating the effects of Russia’s tax reform on voluntary tax compliance
and using the consumption-income function assumed that public or government sector employees are less likely
to be more tax compliant after the tax reform as these individuals are expected to have legitimate incomes from
their employers and not have other incomes from bribery or corruption. On the other hand, individuals in the
private sector, which includes self-employed individuals, are more likely to be tax compliant due to lower tax
rates. This assumption is confirmed by their findings that indicated there is a greater decline in the
consumption-income gap after tax reform for private sector than for the public or government sector, with the
largest gap decline for white collar or higher skilled workers in the private sector.
The private non-profit sector includes Russia’s non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as environmental
groups, religious organizations and health-care associations. According to Wikipedia (2014) NGO is funded by
governments, foundations, businesses or private individuals.
2.1.3 Socio-Demographics Factor
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tax and development report
(2013), the level of tax morale is affected by socio-demographics and economic variables based on an empirical
analysis of individuals in 55 countries who responded to the tax morale question in WVS. Selected variables for
comparison in the report shows that support for democracy has marginal effects of 12.4%, age 7.5%, trust in
government 5.5%, female 3.5%, religious 2.7% and educational attainment 1.5%. Individuals who declared
themselves as having a religious identity have higher tax morale, older people are less likely to cheat, women are
more tax complaint than men, part-time workers and self-employed individuals tend to have lower tax morale
than full-time employees and more educated individuals have more positive attitudes towards paying taxes.
3. Results
3.1 Hypothesis Test
We tested the following null hypotheses to detect changes in individual tax morale for the years considered:
1) H0: Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2006
2) H0: Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2011
3) H0: Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 2006 and 2011
The conventional chi-square test of independence using χ2 ignores the ordering information therefore for ordinal
variables a trend association test is common (Agresti, 2007). To test whether there is change in the distribution of
tax morale between years we performed the Mantel-Haenszel test to detect linear trend association. The test
statistic utilizes the correlation in the data and it is defined as M2= (n-1)r2. Table 4 shows the results of these
tests.
Table 4. Mantel-Haenszel test results
Null Hypothesis

p-value

Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2006

0.10

Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2011

0.72

Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 2006 and 2011

0.24
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The hypothesis results indicated that tax morale overall has not changed significantly over these three periods.
A distribution for tax morale for the dataset is provided in Figure 7. The chart shows that tax morale levels for
1999 and 2011 are about the same, while year 2006 has the largest proportion of individuals who responded that
“tax cheating is never justifiable”, which is level “3” for the highest tax morale level.

Figure 7. Tax morale distribution by year
Given the nature of the scaled response variable, tax morale, we use an ordered probit approach in the estimation.
Because the ordered probit estimation has a nonlinear form, we can interpret directly only the sign of the
estimated coefficients and not their size. We calculated the marginal effects of each independent variable on tax
morale at the highest value of the dependent variable (e.g., the value 3, or “Tax evasion is never justified”).
To relate the tax morale to a set of independent variables, the ordered probit model is expressed in an equation
form.
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑗)] = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 AGE𝑖 + 𝛽2 GENDER 𝑖 + 𝛽3 EDU𝑖 + 𝛽4 MAR. ST𝑖 + 𝛽5 CLASS𝑖 +
𝛽6 EMPL𝑖 + 𝛽7 TRUST𝑖 + 𝛽8 NTL. PRIDE𝑖 + 𝛽9 INCOME. SCALE𝑖 + 𝛽10 WORK. SECTOR 𝑖 , for j = 0,1,2,3

(1)

The model coefficients are estimated with the R-package VGAM (Yee, 2010).
Two scenarios are considered for 2011, one with CLASS variable in the model and one without. The ordered
probit for each year is indicated by Table A1 and Table A2. Table A1 results are obtained with inclusion of
CLASS variable in the model. This is done to account for the possible confounding effect with other variables.
The model is statistically significant, for all three years, p < 0.001, in both scenarios for 2011. Here we discuss
the variables of the ordered probit model and point out the significant one. Since the estimated coefficients from
the ordered probit model do not necessarily lend themselves to a straightforward interpretation, marginal effects
of significant coefficients for variables are discussed in the following section. The marginal effects of categorical
predictors are computed with respect to a reference level and remaining predictors fixed at the mean (mode) for
continuous (categorical) predictors. Marginal effects of continuous variables are computed with respect marginal
change from the mean of variable.
3.2 Significant Variables and Their Marginal Effects on Tax Morale
Among demographic variables, AGE proved to be a significant determinant of tax morale for years 1999 and
2011, p<0.001. Higher age appears to lead to higher tax morale in both years. The positive estimated coefficients
have marginal effects of 0.6% and 0.5%, for 1999 and 2011 respectively. A ten-year increase in age, with respect
to the mean age of around 45-46 years for both years, increases the likeliness of high tax morale by 6% and 5%,
respectively. AGE is not significant for the 2006 data.
The positive coefficient for the variable GENDER is statistically significant, p= 0.007, with a marginal effect of
4.7% for the year 1999. For 2011, p=0.092, with a marginal effect of 3.3%. This implies that women have a
higher probability of high tax morale than men. The GENDER coefficient is not statistically significant in 2006.
Marital status (MAR.ST) has no significant effect for 1999 and 2011. The p value of the Wald-test for the overall
MAR.ST effect is greater than 0.05 for these two waves of data. The model indicates variable significance,
p<0.05 for year 2006 for the two groups “Married” and “Widowed” with marginal effects of 10% and 12%
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respectively.
Individual personal economic situation (CLASS) appears to have an effect on tax morality, data for 2011 only
available. The Wald-test for overall CLASS effect has a p value of 0.029. Coefficients for people in the groups
“Upper” and “Lower Middle” economic classes are significant, p<0.05. These groups exhibit lower tax morale
than the reference group, “Working” class (Table 1). The marginal effects for the upper class and lower middle
class are -33.6% and -5.1%, respectively. Being in the upper class (lower middle) decreases the probability of
high tax morale by 33.4% (5.1%), compared to individuals who identified themselves as belonging to the
working class.
Employment status (EMPL) is overall significant only for 1999 with the Wald-test yielding a p value of 0.02.
Two employment statuses for this year, “self-employed” and “student” result in lower tax morale compared to
the reference group, “full time employed”, with marginal effects of -21.8% and -11.5%. Although there was a
lack of overall significant effect of employment status for 2006, the status “retired” resulted in higher tax morale
with an estimated marginal effect of 9%. There was no employment effect for 2011.
We find that tax morale is higher for respondents with the highest level of trust (TRUST) in the government and
justice system. It had a statistically significant, p<0.05, impact on tax morale in 1999 and 2011, with marginal
effects estimated at 2.0% and 3.9% percentage points. The probability of high tax morale increases by more than
2% (3.9%), with respect to the mean level of trust around 2.1 (2.3), in 1999 (2011), for an extra unit increase in
the TRUST variable, assuming all other variables are at the same level(value). The data for 2006 does not
indicate a significant effect of the TRUST variable.
There is also a statistically significant positive effect of national pride (NATL.PRIDE) on tax morale for 1999
and 2006, p<0.05. The marginal effects are 2.6% in 1999, and 4.6% in 2006. All else being equal, an increase of
one unit in NATL.PRIDE variable, with respect to the mean level of 3.0 (3.2) for 1999 (2006), increases the
likeliness of high tax morale by magnitude of the aforementioned marginal effects.
The variable is significant at the 0.10 level for 2011, p=0.068, with a marginal effect of 2.3%.
Scale of income (INCOME.SCALE) is significant with negative effects for 1999 and 2006, p<0.05. Marginal
effect are -0.8% and -2.8%, respectively. All else being equal, an increase on one unit in INCOME.SCALE, with
respect to the mean level of 5.9 (6.1) for 1999 (2006), decreases the likeliness of high tax morale by the
magnitude of the aforementioned marginal effects. The variable is not significant in the presence of the CLASS
variable for 2011, but is significant at 0.10 if the CLASS variable is not included in the model. Probit regression
results for exclusion of the CLASS variable is provided in Table A2.
WORK.SECTOR, proved to be significant at p<0.05 in 2011, with a -4.7% marginal effect for “Private business
or industry”. People in the private sector are therefore 4.7% less likely to have higher tax morale than those
employed in government institutions. For 2006, the estimated coefficient for WORK.SECTOR, “Private business
or industry” is not significant, and is positive with a p-value of 0.3.
4. Discussion
The effects of a set of determinants for tax morale are estimated using an ordered probit model for Russia during
1999, 2006, and 2011.
Based on the distribution of tax morale in our dataset, the tax morale level is at its highest level in 1999 before
tax reform. The transition to a market economy was tumultuous during the 1990s. A poorly conceived
progressive taxation policy introduced in 1992 did not take into account the longstanding informal institution and
centrally plan economy (Pogorletskiy & Söllner, 2002). In 1992, a progressive tax system was implemented, but
lack of experience in tax administration, a bureaucratic government system, and a society that was deeply
entrenched in connections, tax crimes and policing and corruption, led to a financial crisis in 1998. The much
simplified flat tax system implemented in 2001 which led to significantly lower marginal tax rates for individuals
and businesses have resulted in greater tax revenues for the country. Although it is not clear whether the increase
in tax revenue is due to a change in individual tax compliance or to taxes collected from state-owned oil
companies, findings from microeconomic analysis of household panel data (Ivanova et al., 2005; Gorodnichenko
et al., 2009) provided support for an increase in tax compliance. However, tax compliance is a function of morale
and deterrence. Individual knowledge or perception of others evading taxes, societal and tax administration
institutions have some role in shaping tax morale. This observation has been concluded in a number of different
studies (Torgler, 2005; Taschetti, 2013; Alm & Martinez-Vasquez, 2007). Conditional cooperation theory which
recognizes that individuals may be willing to pay their taxes conditionally on the behavior of others in paying
taxes, is strongly supported in an empirical study that indicated a strong correlation between perceived tax
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evasion and tax morale (Frey & Torgler, 2007). The much simplified tax system is easier to understand compared
to the complicated progressive system introduced in 1992, and may have some role in inducing tax compliance.
The Figure 6 distribution chart shows a decline in tax morale in 2006 and 2011 from 1999. Hypothesis test
results in Table 4 also indicate that there are no significant changes in tax morale from 1999 to 2006 and from
1999 to 2011. The decline in tax morale may be due to an income inequality effect. Lower taxes reduced tax
liability for the wealthy relative to the poor which could lead to an increase in net income inequality, income
shifting and real productivity responses that further increase the net income for the rich (Duncan, 2012). Figure 4
shows the available Gini index for income inequality in Russia from 1999 to 2009 from the World Bank (2014).
The graph plot revealed that the Gini index for inequality in Russia increased from 2006 to 2007, and declined
from 2008 to 2009. In 2009, the Gini index is at 40.1, which is still significantly higher than in 1999 at 37.5.
Private employment is significant for 2011 with a negative marginal effect on tax morale. This may be due to the
high level of corruption in the Russian private employment sector. According to a World Bank report (2013) on
regulatory burden in doing business in Russia, corruption is cited as a major problem in 2011 by 33.5% of
national and regional businesses surveyed in 2011. Although the business climate in general, has improved from
2008 to 2011, the Russia corruption perception index in Figure 1 shows that it is still at a relatively high level.
Our study indicates that a major change in tax structure in 2001 did not have an impact on individual tax morale
for Russia in the three years considered. Income inequality and conditional cooperation theory may provide
promising directions in exploring tax morale. Our findings in this study have certain limitations. Survey data
accessed from WVS and EVS are cleaned by removing observations that have missing values. As a result, the
remaining observations in our dataset may not be representative of the population. This may explain the varying
effects of socio-demographic variables on tax morale in the probit regression results obtained for different years.
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Appendix
Probit regression
Table A1. Results with class status variable
1999

2006

2011

Weighted Ordered Probit
Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient

z-value

Marginal Effect

Demographic Factors
AGE

0.019***

6.789

0.006

0.001

0.265

0

0.017***

5.55

0.005

FEMALE

0.152***

2.682

0.047

0.031

0.404

0.011

0.116*

1.68

0.033

EDUCATION

-0.013

-0.784

-0.004

0.006

0.274

0.002

0.006

0.325

0.002

MARRIED

-0.004

-0.039

-0.001

0.274***

2.654

0.104

0.11

1.25

0.031

DIVORCED

-0.158

-1.461

-0.049

0.248

1.619

0.094

-0.143

-1.23

-0.045

SEPARATED

-0.254

-1.345

-0.081

0.138

0.412

0.053

-0.227

-0.956

-0.073

WIDOWED

-0.029

-0.234

-0.009

0.34**

2.012

0.127

-0.019

-0.138

-0.006

UPPER CLASS

-0.943**

-1.99

-0.336

UPPER MIDDLE CLASS

-0.074

-0.68

-0.021

LOWER MIDDLE CLASS

-0.175**

-2.37

-0.051

Marital Status

Economic Situation
Class Status

Employment Status
PART-TIME EMPLOYED

-0.039

-0.35

-0.012

-0.081

-0.535

-0.03

-0.084

-0.695

-0.024

SELF-EMPLOYED

-0.619***

-3.02

-0.218

-0.332

-0.739

-0.126

-0.117

-0.78

-0.033

UNEMPLOYED

-0.139

-1.461

-0.043

0.092

0.546

0.032

0.256

0.878

0.062

AT HOME

-0.15

-1.31

-0.047

-0.251

-1.505

-0.095

0.049

0.187

0.013

STUDENT

-0.348**

-2.01

-0.115

0.309

1.064

0.102

0.149

0.376

0.038

RETIRED

-0.139

-1.432

-0.043

0.267**

2.021

0.09

-0.013

-0.11

-0.003

OTHER

-0.284

-0.932

-0.092

0.541

0.714

0.165

0.316

0.8

0.074

TRUST IN GOVT &
LEGAL SYSTEM

0.061**

2.079

0.02

0.036

0.743

0.013

0.137***

3.17

0.039

NATIONAL PRIDE

0.079***

2.708

0.026

0.127***

2.854

0.046

0.079*

1.82

0.023

Income Scale

-0.024**

-2.221

-0.008

-0.078***

-4.35

-0.028

-0.026

-1.25

-0.008

PRIVATE

0.086

1.048

0.03

-0.162**

-2.218

-0.047

PRIVATE NON-PROFIT

-0.019

-0.118

-0.007

-0.112

-0.65

-0.032

Trust and Pride

Work Sector
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Table A2. Results without class status variable
1999

2006

2011

Weighted Ordered Probit
Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect
Demographic Factors
AGE

0.019***

6.789

0.006

0.001

0.265

0

0.017***

5.54

0.005

FEMALE

0.152***

2.682

0.047

0.031

0.404

0.011

0.112

1.639

0.034

-0.013

-0.784

-0.004

0.006

0.274

0.002

-0.004

-0.225

-0.001

MARRIED

-0.004

-0.039

-0.001

0.274***

2.654

0.104

0.104

1.189

0.032

DIVORCED

-0.158

-1.461

-0.049

0.248

1.619

0.094

-0.145

-1.249

-0.048

SEPARATED

-0.254

-1.345

-0.081

0.138

0.412

0.053

-0.217

-0.913

-0.073

WIDOWED

-0.029

-0.234

-0.009

0.34**

2.012

0.127

-0.021

-0.148

-0.007

EDUCATION
Marital Status

Economic Situation
Employment Status
PART-TIME EMPLOYED

-0.039

-0.35

-0.012

-0.081

-0.535

-0.03

-0.077

-0.642

-0.023

-0.619***

-3.02

-0.218

-0.332

-0.739

-0.126

-0.156

-1.058

-0.048

UNEMPLOYED

-0.139

-1.461

-0.043

0.092

0.546

0.032

0.267

0.919

0.069

AT HOME

-0.15

-1.31

-0.047

-0.251

-1.505

-0.095

0.084

0.324

0.24

STUDENT

-0.348**

-2.01

-0.115

0.309

1.064

0.102

0.076

0.194

0.021

RETIRED

-0.139

-1.432

-0.043

0.267**

2.021

0.09

-0.016

-0.144

-0.005

OTHER

-0.284

-0.932

-0.092

0.541

0.714

0.165

0.316

0.802

0.08

TRUST IN GOVT &
LEGAL SYSTEM

0.061**

2.079

0.02

0.036

0.743

0.013

0.132***

3.066

0.04

NATIONAL PRIDE

0.079***

2.708

0.026

0.127***

2.854

0.046

0.087**

2.026

0.027

Income Scale

-0.024**

-2.221

-0.008

-0.078***

-4.35

-0.028

-0.035*

-1.789

-0.011

SELF-EMPLOYED

Trust and Pride

Work Sector
PRIVATE

0.086

1.048

0.03

-0.162**

-2.189

-0.05

PRIVATE NON-PROFIT

-0.019

-0.118

-0.007

-0.13

-0.764

-0.04

Footnotes for Table A1 and Table A2: Total number of observations for complete records with no missing values for any variables in the model are 2039
for the 1999 survey, 1162 for the 2006 survey and 1370 for the 2011 survey. The dependent variable is TAX MORALE, measured on a four point scale
(0 to 3). Marginal effects are calculated at the highest tax morale score (3). Reference groups are MALE, SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, and
FULL-TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.05<p<0.10, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A3. Frequency table
Freq#

Relative Frequency

Categorical Variables
1999

2006

2011

1999

2006

2011

- Level 0

674

380

432

0.331

0.327

0.315

- Level 1

195

88

146

0.096

0.076

0.107

- Level 2

221

91

158

0.108

0.078

0.115

- Level 3

949

603

634

0.465

0.519

0.463

- Male

854

534

630

0.419

0.460

0.460

- Female

1185

628

740

0.581

0.540

0.540

Tax Morale

GENDER
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Marital Status
SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER

286

213

287

0.140

0.183

0.209

MARRIED

1110

719

692

0.544

0.619

0.505

DIVORCED

271

101

195

0.133

0.087

0.142

SEPARATED

47

14

27

0.023

0.012

0.020

WIDOWED

318

115

169

0.156

0.099

0.123

Economic Situation
WORKING CLASS/LOWER CLASS

672

UPPER CLASS

8

UPPER MIDDLE CLASS

197

LOWER MIDDLE CLASS

493

Employment Status
FULL-TIME

975

723

865

0.478

0.622

0.631

PART-TIME EMPLOYED

123

69

106

0.060

0.059

0.077

SELF-EMPLOYED

37

7

71

0.018

0.006

0.052

UNEMPLOYED

195

62

17

0.096

0.053

0.012

AT HOME

72

60

21

0.035

0.052

0.015

STUDENT

63

19

9

0.031

0.016

0.007

RETIRED

559

219

272

0.274

0.188

0.199

OTHER

15

3

9

0.007

0.003

0.007

GOVERNMENT

614

667

0.528

0.487

PRIVATE

489

651

0.421

0.475

PRIVATE NON-PROFIT

59

52

0.051

0.038

Work Sector

Footnote: Total number of observations for complete records with no missing values for any variables in the model are 2039 for the 1999 survey,
1162 for the 2006 survey and 1370 for the 2011 survey.

Table A4. Descriptive statistics
Continuous Variables

Min

1st Quartile

Median

Mean

3rd Quartile

Max

Age

Education

Trust in Govt/Legal

National Pride

Income Scale

1999

18

1

1

1

1

2006

16

2

1

1

1

2011

18

1

1

1

1

1999

33

4

1

2

3

2006

31

5

2

3

4

2011

31

5

2

3

3

1999

45

5

2

3

6

2006

44

6

2

3

6

2011

45

6

2

3

5

1999

46.3

5.1

2.14

2.96

5.88

2006

43.8

6.46

2.26

3.24

6.08

2011

45.2

6.57

2.25

3.09

4.37

1999

60

6

3

4

8

2006

54

9

3

4

8

2011

57

9

3

4

6

1999

90

8

4

4

10

2006

76

9

4

4

10

2011

91

9

4

4

10
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Table A5. Variable description
Variable

Definition

TAX MORALE

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something
in between. Cheating on tax if you have the chance (3=never and 0=always)

CLASSES

Available 2011only: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or
lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:
1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class (reference group)
5. Lower class (reference group)

EDUCATION

1999: What is the highest educational level that you
have attained?

2006/2011: What is the highest educational level that you have attained?

1. Inadequately completed elementary education

2 Incomplete primary school

2. Completed (compulsory) elementary education

3 Complete primary school

3. (Compulsory) elementary education and basic
vocational qualification

4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type

1 No formal education

5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type

4. Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification

6 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type

5. Secondary, intermediate general qualification

7 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type

6. Full secondary, maturity level certificate

8 Some university-level education, without degree

7. Higher education – lower-level tertiary certificate

9 University-level education, with degree

8. Higher education – upper-level tertiary certificate
MARITAL
STATUS

1999: What is your current legal marital status?

2006/2011: Are you currently

1 married

1 Married

2 widowed

2 Living together as married

3 divorced

3 Divorced

4 separated

4 Separated

5 never married

5 Widowed

6 cohabiting

6 Single

7 single
EMPLOYMENT 1999: Employment status
STATUS
1 has paid employment: 30h a week or more

2006/2011: Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many
hours a week?
Yes, has paid employment:

2 has paid employment: less than 30h a week
3 has paid employment: self employed

1 Full time employee (30 hours a week or more)

4 if no paid employment: retired/pensioned

2 Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week)
3 Self-employed

5 if no paid employment: housewife not otherwise
employed

No, no paid employment:

6 if no paid employment: student

4 Retired/pensioned

7 if no paid employment: unemployed

5 Housewife not otherwise employed

8 if no paid employment: other (please specify)

6 Student
7 Unemployed
8 Other (write in)

1999: How much confidence in: justice system?
TRUST IN
GOVERNMENT/ (4 = a great deal to 1 = none at all).
LEGAL SYSTEM

2006/2011: Index (average) of the following two questions:
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in
your capital: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence,
not very much confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 =none at
all).
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: is
it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much
confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 = none at all).
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TRUST IN
JUSTICE
SYSTEM

1999: How much confidence in: justice system (4 =
a great deal to 1 =none at all).

NATIONAL
PRIDE

1999/2006/2011: How proud are you to be …….? (own nationality)

Vol. 8, No. 1; 2015

2006/2011: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the
justice system:
Is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much
confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 =none at all).

1. Not at all proud
2. Not very proud
3. Quite proud
4. very proud

WORK
SECTOR

2006/2011: Are you working for the government or public institution, for private business or industry, or for a private non-profit
organization?
1 Government or public institution
2 Private business or industry
3 Private non-profit organization

INCOME
SCALE

1999: Income household respondent

2006/2011: Please, specify the appropriate number,
counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes
that come in.

64301 RU: 350 RUB or less per month
64302 RU: 351-400 RUB

1. Lowest group

64303 RU: 401-500 RUB
64304 RU: 501-700 RUB

2.

64305 RU: 701-800 RUB

3.
.

64306 RU: 801-1,000 RUB
64307 RU: 1,001-1,300 RUB

.

64308 RU: 1,301-1,700 RUB

10 Highest group
(1=lowest income group to10=highest income group)

64309 RU: 1,701-2,500 RUB
64310 RU: more than 2,500 RUB
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